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How does the primary market value innovations of newly public firms? 
 
Abstract 
We investigate whether and how the primary market values the innovations of newly public 
firms at their IPOs by examining the link between the size (the number of patents) and the 
quality (citation count) of their patent portfolios and IPO valuations. We find that the number of 
patents, the citation count, and innovation efficiency (patents or citations scaled by research and 
development expenditure) are positively associated with offer price multiples but the effect of 
the number of patents subsumes that of the citation count/innovation efficiency. There is no 
significant effect of patent portfolios on price revisions or first-day returns, suggesting that 
underwriters/firms price information on innovation quantity and quality in the offer prices and 
the market makes no further price adjustment on innovation information. The positive effect of 
innovation quantity on IPO valuation subsumes that of innovation quality. We also demonstrate 
that the link between patent portfolios and IPO valuations is stronger in the later sample period. 
Using Tobin’s Q as another IPO valuation measure produces similar results. We obtain no 
evidence that an IPO’s patent portfolio is overvalued in the primary market, as the number of 
patents and the citation count are not significantly associated with long-run stock and operating 
performances.   
Keywords: innovation output; IPO valuations; patents; citation count; innovation efficiency; 
Tobin’s Q 




Recent studies have found that firms reach the apex of their innovative activities at the 
time of their IPOs (Bernstein, 2015), and firms often choose to go public following an innovative 
breakthrough (Pastor, Taylor, and Veronesi, 2009). This phenomenon leads us to ask how the 
primary market values the innovations of newly public firms at their IPOs. While IPO valuations 
have been examined extensively in the literature, less is known about the link between 
innovation and IPO valuation. This question is particularly relevant given that the composition of 
R&D investment has significantly shifted away from federal funding to private funding since 
19601 and young firms’ reliance on public equity issuances to fund R&D investment has 
increased over the past decades (Brown, Fazzari, and Petersen, 2009).  
Innovations boost market share, provide competitive advantage, and increase earnings. 
Previous studies document that innovations are valued in the secondary market. However, it is 
not clear how the primary market incorporates IPO firms’ innovation capability, measured by the 
size (the number of patents), quality (citation count), and innovation efficiency of their patent 
portfolio. The primary market may underestimate valuation information in patents of IPO firms. 
Technological information about a patent is hard to decipher for most investors. In addition, 
evaluating the value of patents requires analyzing the patent, product development and the 
launch of the product on the market, the profit of which can be highly uncertain and long 
deferred. Further, the distribution of patent values is highly skewed, with a few patents having a 
very high value and a large number of patents having low value. Several studies have shown that 
the market seems to underreact to valuation information regarding seasoned firms’ patents. Gu 
(2005) finds that changes in scaled patent citations are positively associated with firms’ future 
stock returns. Matcolcsy and Wyatt (2008) find that patent count at the industry level is 
                                                                 
1 See the Congressional Budget Office’s 2005 report entitled “R&D and Productivity Growth”. 
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positively associated with contemporaneous market valuations. Cohen, Diether, and Malloy 
(2013) find that firms with past success in innovation (measured as how firms turn R&D into 
future sales) outperform other firms that invest the same amount in R&D. Hirshleifer, Hsu, and 
Li (2012) document a positive relationship between innovative efficiency (patents or citations 
scaled by R&D expenditures) and future stock returns. If the market fails to fully value 
innovations for seasoned firms with more predictable and persistent performance, the primary 
market is likely to undervalue innovation for these newly public IPO firms with less certain 
future, leading to a positive relation between innovation and future stock returns for IPOs.2 
On the other hand, the primary market may overestimate valuation information in patents 
of IPO firms, as investors may be overoptimistic about the contribution of patents to the future 
performance of IPO firms. This view is consistent with the finding that R&D-intensive firms 
tend to be overpriced as investors overestimate the benefits from R&D or simply ignore the fact 
that many R&D investments are not profitable (Jensen (1993)). Similarly, Daniel and Titman 
(2006) show that growth stock underperformance is concentrated in stocks with significant 
“intangible” information, consistent with market overreaction to intangible information that is 
difficult to interpret. Loughran and Ritter (1995) document long-run underperformance of IPO 
firms, suggesting that investors are overoptimistic about the prospects of firms when they go 
public. Purnandam and Swaminathan (2004) document that investors are deceived by optimistic 
growth forecasts and overvalue IPOs with high growth potential. Investors may over extrapolate 
IPO firms’ earnings growth based on their patent portfolios, leading to innovation being 
overpriced at the IPO and hence to a negative relation between innovation and future stock 
                                                                 
2 Hirshleifer, Hsu, and Li (2012) find a stronger innovation efficiency-stock return relation among young and 
smaller seasoned firms.  
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returns for IPO firms. Therefore, whether the primary market overvalues or undervalues 
innovations of IPOs is an empirical question.  
In this paper, we analyze a sample of 4,795 IPOs during the period 1981-2006 to examine 
whether and how the primary market values innovations of IPO firms at the time of offering. 
First, we investigate the effects of the presence and various measures of patent portfolios on IPO 
valuation ratios to examine whether underwriters/issuers incorporate pre-IPO patent portfolios to 
set IPO valuations.  We find that firms with patents expect and receive significantly higher 
valuations than firms without patents when filing for an IPO after controlling for firm and issue 
characteristics. For IPOs with patents, the number of patents, citation count, and innovation 
efficiency are positively associated with IPO valuation ratios after extensive controls but that the 
effect of the number of patents subsumes that of the citation count and innovation efficiency.3 
The size of patent portfolios is the dominant factor in IPO valuations. Splitting the sample into 
two sub-periods, 1981-1993 and 1993-2006, we find a positive effect of patent portfolios on 
valuations in both periods but that the effect is significant only in the second sub-period. This 
evidence suggests that markets (underwriters) have improved their ability to value patents for 
IPO firms.   
Second, we investigate how various measures of patent portfolios are related to 
short/long run IPO performances to examine whether the market undervalue or overvalue 
innovations of IPOs  based the market reaction to the valuation effect of patent portfolios for 
IPOs. We find that these patent-related factors have no effect on initial returns, a measure of 
valuation adjustment from IPO prices during the first trading day after offerings. We also 
document that there is no significant association between the number of patents/citation count 
                                                                 
3 These regressions control for industry valuation, industry adjusted operating performance, leverage, R&D, sales 
growth, venture capitalist backing, firm age, underwriter reputation, and industry and year effect s. 
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and abnormal buy-and-hold returns up to three years after IPOs. Finally, we find no relation 
between post-IPO operating performances and the size and quality of patent portfolios at IPOs. 
Overall, these findings suggest that IPOs with larger patent portfolios are not underpriced or 
overpriced in the primary market, leading to no abnormal long-run stock performance in the 
secondary equity market.  
By examining whether and how the primary market prices patent portfolios of IPOs, our 
paper adds to the growing literature on innovation and IPO valuation. Specifically, using a more 
general sample over a longer time period, we measure IPO firms’ innovations with a host of 
patent-related measures and focus on the effect of innovations on IPO valuation multiples at 
different stages of the IPO process. That leads to two significant new findings. First, pre-IPO 
innovation seems to be priced correctly in the IPO process as the number of patents and the 
citation count are not significantly associated with short/long-run stock performances, i.e., there 
are no incremental returns associated with pre-IPO patent portfolios in the aftermarket. Second, 
all measures of patent portfolios have positive effects but the size of patent portfolios is the 
dominant factor in IPO valuations, possibly because technological information about a patent is 
hard to decipher but the number of patents is a simple and easier concept to grasp. 
Early studies often use the input of innovations – R&D expenditure. For example, Guo, 
Lev, and Shi (2006) focus on the link between R&D expenditure and IPO underpricing and long-
run performance. They find R&D is positively related to long-term performance. Several recent 
studies examine IPO pricing and the innovation output, i.e., the patent. Most use patent counts as 
a measure of information asymmetry and focus on the relationship between patent counts and 
short/long run performance. Guo, Lev, and Zhou (2005) study 122 biotech IPOs during the 
period 1991-2000 and find that firms with more patent-protection products are associated with 
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higher underpricing and lower long-run stock return. They interpret this as over optimism 
regarding patent protection at the time of IPOs. Heeley, Matusik, and Jain (2007) study 1,413 
manufacturing IPOs from 1981 to 1998. They find that patents reduce underpricing in the 
industries where the link between patents and returns is transparent, such as the pharmaceutical 
sector, while patents increase underpricing in the industries where the link is complex, similar to 
the computer sector. Bessler and Bittelmeyer (2008) study 287 German IPOs from 1997 to 2002, 
of which 90 firms have patents. They find underpricing of IPOs with patents is lower relative to 
the group of IPOs without patents in hot markets. The relationship is reversed in cold markets. 
They also find high abnormal long-run returns for IPOs with patents compared to IPOs without 
patents.  
Our paper also adds to the literature on innovation activity and IPO. Ferreira, Manso, and 
Silva (2012) develop a theoretical model showing that private ownership encourages firm 
innovation. Bernstein (2015) finds that firms’ internal innovations go down after their IPOs. Tian 
and Wang (2011) find that IPOs backed by more failure tolerant VCs are more innovative. 
Barnanchuk, Kieschnick, and Moussawi (2014) show that incentive compensation, long vesting 
periods for unexercised options, and tolerance for failure motivate managers to pursue 
innovation in IPO firms after their offerings.   
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data sources and 
sample. Section 3 presents the results. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Sample and Data 
This section discusses IPO sample selection, patent metrics as measures of innovations, 
and the summary statistics comparing IPOs with and without patents at the time of IPOs. 
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2.1. IPO sample selection 
We use the Securities Data Corporation Global New Issues Database (hereafter, SDC) to 
identify all IPOs from January 1, 1981 to December 31, 2006.4 After correcting mistakes and 
typographical errors in the SDC database according to Jay Ritter’s procedure 
(http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm), we eliminate financial firms (SIC codes 
between 6000 and 6999), utilities firms (SIC codes between 4900 and 4999), unit offer, closed-
end funds (including REIT), ADR, limited partnerships, special acquisition vehicles, and spin-
offs. We then require IPOs to have pre-IPO accounting information available from Compustat. 
Following this procedure, we identify 4,795 completed IPOs during the period 1981-2006.  
2.2. Patent measures 
We use patent related metrics to measure firms’ pre-IPO innovation activities because 
patents are successful outcomes of past research and development efforts (Hall, Jaffe, and 
Trajtenberg, 2001). Patents enable firms to maintain a competitive advantage for a lasting period 
of time and are intrinsically valuable. The patent variables are constructed from the latest version 
of the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) patent database. The database was 
initially created by Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001) and contains updated patent and citation 
information from 1976 to 2006. Following the literature, we focus only on utility patent grants 
rather than other awards, such as design or reissue awards. Utility patents represent 
approximately 99% of all awards (Lerner, Sorensen, and Stromberg, 2011).  
The NBER patent database contains detailed information on all US patents granted by the 
US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO): patent assignee names, firms’ Compustat identifiers 
(GVKEY), and the number of citations received by each patent, application year, grant dates, and 
                                                                 
4 Our IPO sample begins in 1981 because the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) patent database starts 
from 1976, and we examine an IPO’s patents from 5 years prior to its offering to the offering date.  
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other details. We use 6-digit Cusip for each IPO from SDC to match historical CUSIP variables 
in CRSP and Compustat to retrieve CRSP Permno and Compustat GVKEY. We then use 
GVKEY to match NBER patent data. We also use company names and ticker symbol to verify 
our matching accuracy.  
To prevent any potential look-ahead bias, we follow Hirshleifer, Hsu, and Li (2012) and 
choose the grant date as the effective date of each patent. We use patents in the five years prior to 
the IPO to proxy for the firm’s pre-IPO innovative capability. The basic measure of innovation 
output is a simple count of patent grants in the five years before the IPO date to capture the 
quantity of patents. Following Bernstein (2015) and Bena and Li (2014), we calculate the scaled 
patent count, as patent grants vary over time and across technologies. First, for each technology 
class5 defined by USPTO and the patent grant year, we compute the average number of granted 
patents of all firms in its technology class within that grant year. Second, we scale the number of 
patents granted to the firm in the technology class in that year by the corresponding average 
value for that technology class and grant year from the first step. Third, for each firm, we sum 
the scaled number of granted patents from the second step across all technology classes and 
across 5 years prior to the IPO dates. Lastly, we use scaled number of patents divided by total 
assets in the fiscal year immediately before the IPO to control for the size effect. 
We also use citation count – the number of citations a patent receives after its approval – 
as another measure of innovation output because the importance of patents varies. We calculate 
citations for patents granted over the five years prior to IPO dates. The citation count is the 
number of citations a patent receives upon its approval to the IPO year. We adjust for time and 
                                                                 
5 Technology classes are defined by the USPTO to capture the technological essence of an invention. Technological 
classes are often more detailed than industry classifications , with about 400 main (3-digit) patent classes and over 
120,000 patent subclasses. 
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technology variation by scaling each patent citation count by the average number of citations 
received by all patents granted in the same year and technology class. For firm i, we calculate 
𝐶𝑖𝑘
𝑗
, the number of citations received in year j (j=max (-5, grant year-IPO year) to j=0, year 0 is 
the IPO year) by patent k, scaled by the average number of citations received in year j by all 
patents of the same technology class granted in the same year. Second, we sum scaled citations 
for IPO firm i’s patents granted over the five years before its IPO date as following:  





𝑗=max (−5,𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡  𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟−𝐼𝑃𝑂  𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 )
 
The final measure, innovation efficiency (IE), compares patent count or citation to R&D 
expenses (Hirshleifer, Hsu, and Li, 2012). Patents and citations are the output of the innovation 
process. R&D measures the innovation input. Innovation efficiency measures a firm’s ability to 
generate patents and patent citations per dollar of R&D expenditure. We use two proxies for 
innovation efficiency: scaled number of patents and scaled current citations divided by R&D 
expenses in the year prior to the IPO dates (Innovation efficiency-Pat and Innovation efficiency-
Citation).6  
2.3. Other control variables 
For our multivariate regressions, we include several other control variables from the 
literature in an attempt to isolate the portion of the IPO valuation or firm performance that is 
related to an IPO’s patent portfolio. Following Bhojraj and Lee (2002), we use PSind, the industry 
(based on the two-digit primary SIC code) median ratio of market value divided by total sales for 
                                                                 
6 We thank an anonymous referee who suggested this additional innovation measure. Hirshleifer, Hsu, and Li (2013) 
use 5-year cumulative R&D expenses assuming an annual depreciation rate of 20% in the fiscal year ending 2 years 
before its patent approval to calculate their innovation efficiency meas ures. For our sample of 922 IPOs with 
patents, we use R&D expenses in the year prior to the IPO date to compute innovation efficiency because only 321 




the IPO year, to proxy industry valuation. In addition, we include other valuation factors to 
control for firms’ operating performance and leverage. Prior industry-adjusted OPA equals the 
difference between the IPO firm's OPA and the median OPA of its industry. The Leverage is 
defined as the ratio of total liabilities over total assets. Poulsen and Stegemoller (2008) show that 
private firms with higher growth potential choose an IPO instead of being acquired and valuation 
ratios for IPOs are significantly higher than those of comparable private targets. Therefore, we 
include R&D, the ratio of R&D expenses divided by total assets in the fiscal year prior to the 
IPO date, and Growth, the sales growth rate from the year prior to the IPO to the IPO year as the 
proxies for growth in the regressions. All the financial information except for the industry 
valuation PSind is for the fiscal year prior to the IPOs. 
Megginson and Weiss (1991) find that venture capitalists provide a certification and 
monitoring role. We include a dummy variable VC to indicate whether a firm is backed by 
venture capitalists. We follow Loughran and Ritter (2004) to include a dummy variable Top IB 
that equals one if the underwriter has a rank of 8 or higher. We use the updated Carter-Manaster 
Reputation ranking for IPO underwriter available at Jay Ritter’s website 
(http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm). More information is available about the value 
of older firms. We also control for firm age (Age), measured as the number of years since 
founding, which is also provided by Jay Ritter’s IPO data website. IPO markets are cyclical. We 
control for IPO market condition, measured as the average initial returns of IPOs within the same 
two-digit primary SIC industry code of the sample IPO between the firm's IPO filing date and its 
IPO date. We also use Proceeds, the number of shares sold in the offering multiplied by the offer 
price, to control for IPO size. Technology IPO firms experience higher first day returns 
(Loughran and Ritter (2004)). Accordingly, we include a Tech dummy variable, defined in 
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Loughran and Ritter (2004). Underpricing is more prominent during the dot-com bubble period. 
We include the dummy variable Bubble, which equals one if an IPO occurred in 1999 or 2000 
and zero otherwise. Descriptive statistics are provided for these variables in Panel C of Table 1. 
We also provide additional details about each variable’s calculation in the Appendix.  
2.4. Sample characteristics 
IPOs with patents are firms with at least one patent granted in the five years before their 
IPO dates; IPOs without patents are firms with no patent granted during the same period.7 Panel 
A of Table 1 reports the year distribution of IPOs. Our sample spans periods of both hot and cold 
IPO markets. Overall, 19% of IPOs have patents before offering. However, the proportion of 
IPOs with patents is lower at the beginning of our sample period – 17% in 1981 and 
approximately 13% for the period 1981-1989.  
Panel B details the industry composition of the 4,795 sample IPOs. Based on the Song 
and Walking (1993) industry classification, our sample is well scattered across several industries; 
the Services industry exhibits some clustering with over 30% (1,448/4,795) of IPOs from that 
industry. The proportion of IPOs with patents varies significantly across industries; IPOs from 
technological industries such as Chemicals (including pharmaceutical and biotech firms with SIC 
of 28) (34%), Machinery (41%), and Instruments (48%) are more likely to have patents before 
                                                                 
7 There are 268 IPO firms that have received patent grants during their book building process. In unreported 
analyses, we find no significant impact of newly approved patents on final offer price, price revision, or 
underpricing. Information for pending patents is typically released via SEC filings and provides direct 
communication to prospective investors prior to IPOs. In addition, we also investigate the effect of patent 
applications filed during the book building process on IPO valuations. The NBER patent database only provides 
information on the patent application year, not the exact application date. We use the Harvard patent network 
Dataverse to obtain filing dates of patent applications. We then identify IPO firms that file patent applications during 
their book building process. We have 400 such IPOs; 253 of them receive patent grants in the five years before IPOs 
(IPOs with patents) and 147 IPOs do not receive any patent grant prior to IPOs (IPOs without patents).The 
unreported results show that for IPOs with patents, having patent applications filed during book building has no 
significant effect on IPO valuations. However, for IPOs without patents, there are significantly positive effects on 




IPOs. To control for the effect of time and industry variations in our sample IPOs, we control for 
industry and year fixed-effects in regressions. Panel C compares issue and firm characteristics of 
IPOs with and without patents. IPOs with patents have a higher offer price and receive larger 
proceeds from offerings than IPOs without patents. IPOs with patents are more likely to be 
backed by VCs, to be underwritten by top-tier investment banks, and to be a high-tech company 
than IPOs without patents. Further, IPOs with patents are larger in total assets and sales. They 
invest more in R&D expenditures than IPOs without patents. However, IPOs with patents are 
less profitable and have lower leverage than IPOs without patents. Valuation ratios are skewed, 
and we report the median and the mean. Based on the median, IPOs with patents initially file for 
$4.39 and receive $4.31 for each dollar of sales, which is significantly higher than those for IPOs 
without patents at $2.56 and $2.51, respectively. There is no significant difference in price 
revisions or underpricing between IPOs with and without patents. Panel D reports patent 
information for IPOs with patents. On average, an IPO has 9.73 patents (2.14 scaled patents), 
receives 17.74 citations (6.3 scaled citations) up to the IPO date. On average, per $1 million 
dollar of total assets, an IPO has 0.14 scaled patents and receives 0.36 scaled citations up to its 
IPO date. 
 
3. Empirical Results 
3.1. IPO valuations: with patents vs. without patents 
We first examine the difference in IPO valuations of IPOs with and without patents to 
answer the question whether having a patent is valued in the primary market. We investigate four 
aspects of IPO valuations: Expected valuation ratio, the mid-point of the preliminary offer price 
range divided by sales per share for the fiscal year prior to the IPO date; Offer valuation ratio, 
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final offer price divided by sales per share for the fiscal year prior to the IPO date; Price 
revisions, the percentage change from the initial offer price to the final offer price; and Initial 
returns, the percentage change from the final offer price to the market price at the end of first 
trading day. These four measures reflect how the primary market values IPOs with and without 
patents at different phases of initial public offerings. When a firm files for an IPO, its 
underwriters help it set an expected offer price range in the preliminary prospectus (S-1 form) 
filed with the SEC. Expected valuation ratio reflects how the underwriters value the IPO. 
Underwriters and the issuer then solicit information from investors during the roadshow. Based 
on the feedback from the book building process, they make adjustments on the initial offer price 
and set the final offer price on the night before IPO dates. Offer valuation ratio reflects how the 
IPO is valued by the primary market after incorporating information from the book building 
process, and Price revisions reflects the valuation adjustments made. Initial returns measure the 
difference between the valuation of the IPO in secondary market trading and the primary market.  
Panel A of Table 2 reports the regressions of these four measures of IPO valuation for the 
full sample period. To test whether having patents before the IPO date incrementally affects the 
IPO valuations, we include several variables related to the IPO valuations. In Columns 1 and 2, 
we estimate the following models for valuation ratios based on the expected offer prices and 
final offer prices, respectively: 
Ln(Valuation ratio)𝑖 = β0+β1𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖 +β2𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖 + β3𝐿𝑛(𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑠)𝑖 + β4 Prior industry-adjusted OPA 𝑖
+ β5𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑅&𝐷𝑖 +β7 𝐺𝑟𝑤𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑖  +β8 𝑉𝐶𝑖+β9𝐿𝑛(𝐴𝑔𝑒)𝑖
+ β10𝑇𝑜𝑝 𝐼𝐵𝑖 +β11 𝐵𝑢𝑏𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖 +β12𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑖
+ fixed effects + 𝜀𝑖                                                                                                                                         (1) 
The valuation ratio is the expected valuation ratio (offer valuation ratio) for column 1 
(column 2). We use the log of valuation ratio to account for the high skewness of IPO valuation 
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ratios. The dummy variable Patent is defined as one if an IPO firm has at least one patent 
granted in the five years before its IPO date and zero if an IPO firm has no patent granted during 
the same period. The coefficient estimates of other variables are consistent with the literature and 
are robust across Columns 1 and 2. For example, as shown in Bhojraj and Lee (2002) and Lian 
and Wang (2009), IPOs with lower leverage and/or from an industry with a higher valuation ratio 
tend to receive higher IPO valuations based on expected and final offer price. VC backing has a 
significant, positive effect on valuation ratios (Megginson and Weiss, 1991; Schultz, 1993; Brav 
and Gompers, 2003). IPOs with higher R&D expenditures and/or faster sales growth receive 
higher valuation ratios (Kim and Ritter 1999, and Poulsen and Stegemoller 2008). Larger IPOs 
with a higher amount of proceeds raised receive lower valuation ratios. The estimated 
coefficients for Patent are positive and significant. Controlling for other factors, IPOs with 
patents are valued on average 13.6%/12.6% higher at the initial filing/final offering than IPOs 
without patents. The primary market does incorporate the value of patents into the initial prices 
before IPO dates. Specifically, underwriters anticipate that investors will take notice of the 
positive information implied by having a patent and incorporate that into the offer price from the 
initial filing of the offering.   
Column 3/4 reports the estimations of Price revisions/Initial returns regressions: 
Price revisions/Initial returns𝑖 = β0 +β1𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 + β2𝐿𝑛(𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑠)𝑖 + β3Prior industry-adjusted OPA 𝑖
+ β4𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑅&𝐷𝑖 +β6𝐺𝑟𝑤𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑖  +β7 𝑉𝐶𝑖+β8𝐿𝑛(𝐴𝑔𝑒 )𝑖
+ β9𝑇𝑜𝑝 𝐼𝐵𝑖  +β10𝐵𝑢𝑏𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖 +β11𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑖 +β12 𝐼𝑃𝑂 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡  𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 /𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖
+ fixed effects + 𝜀𝑖                                                                                                                                        (2) 
Price revisions reflect the adjustments made by underwriters and issuers to incorporate 
the information revealed during book building (Beneniste and Spindt 1989). Therefore, if 
underwriters fully incorporate having a patent into the expected offer price at the initial filing, we 
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would expect that IPOs with and without patents experience similar price revisions over the book 
building phase. If underwriters do not fully value having patents at the initial filing valuations, 
we should find the price revisions of IPOs with patents to be higher than IPOs without. To test 
this conjecture, we estimate a model of price revisions to control for other related factors similar 
to Dunbar and Forester (2008).8 The results are largely consistent with prior studies. For 
example, the coefficient estimates for Bubble and Tech dummy variables are both positive and 
significant. Most importantly, the coefficient for Patent dummy is negative but insignificant, 
suggesting that underwriters incorporate the information that the IPO firms have patents into the 
expected offer price and do not make further price adjustments for IPOs with patents.  
IPOs with and without patents could have different Initial returns. The first day closing 
prices are likely upwardly biased estimates of true value due to the participation of sentimental 
investors who overpay for the IPOs (Ljungqvist, Nanda, and Singh, 2006, and Cook, Kieschnick, 
and VanNess, 2006). The first day closing prices are higher for IPOs with patents if investors are 
overoptimistic about the contribution of patents to IPO firms’ future performance. Column 4 
reports the estimations of Initial returns regression. The inferences on the control variables are 
generally consistent with the literature. Older IPOs have lower initial returns due to lower 
information asymmetry (e.g., Loughran and Ritter, 2004). Initial returns are positively related to 
price revisions, consistent with the partial adjustment relation between price discovery and 
information inducement (Hanley, 1993 and Johns and Ligon, 2009). Initial returns are more 
prominent during the dot-com bubble period as shown by the positive and significant coefficients 
of the Bubble dummy (e.g., Loughran and Ritter, 2004, Ljungqvist and Wilhelm, 2003). 
                                                                 
8 Dunbar and Forester (2008)’s regression model on price revisions is based on the literature on price adjustments 




However, the coefficient for the Patent dummy is not significant. IPOs with patents are not 
underpriced more than IPOs without patents.   
Hall, Jaffe, and Trejtenberg (2005) find that the link between citations/patents stocks and 
firm valuations for seasoned firms is stronger in the more recent time period. They suggest that 
changes in the patenting behavior of US firms during the mid-1980s due to the strengthening of 
patent rights and the sharp increase in the rate of patenting. To investigate whether there is 
similar time variation in the link between patent portfolios and IPO valuations, we split the 
sample into two sub-periods, 1981-1993 and 1994-20069. Panel B of Table 2 reports the 
regressions of IPO valuations for two sub-periods. It shows that markets and underwriters have 
improved their ability to value patents for newly public firms over time. In the early sub-period, 
IPOs with patents are valued on average 5.7%/4.3% higher at the initial filing/final offering than 
IPOs without patents although insignificantly. In the later sub-period, IPOs with patents are 
valued on average 18.4%/17.9% significantly higher at the initial filing/final offering than IPOs 
without patents. 
3.2. IPO valuations of IPOs with patents 
Given that IPOs with patents receive higher valuation than IPOs without patents, we 
focus on IPOs with patents to examine how the size and the quality of their patent portfolio at the 
time of offering are related to IPO valuations in this section. Specifically, we investigate how the 
number of patents, the citation count, and innovation efficiency described in section 2.2 are 
correlated with valuation ratios (Table 3) and initial returns (Table 4). The coefficients of other 
control variables are consistent with section 3.1 and previous studies; we focus on the 
coefficients of the number of patents, the citation count, and innovation efficiency in this section. 
 
                                                                 
9 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this analysis. 
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3.2.1 Final IPO valuations (offer prices) 
Panel A of Table 3 reports the results of regressions on IPO valuations based on offer 
prices to examine whether the size, quality of patent portfolios, and innovation efficiency are 
priced into the final IPO valuations of IPOs with patents. The model is similar to Eq. 1, with 
Patent dummy replaced by various patent metrics. We include Ln (Scaled Patent/Assets+1) to 
control only for the size of patent portfolios in column 1. In column 2, we include Ln (Scaled 
Citation/Assets+1) to control only for the quality of patent portfolios. The coefficients of both 
are significant at the 1% level. In column 3, we include Ln (Scaled Patent/Assets+1) and Ln 
(Scaled Citation/Assets+1) to control for the size and quality of patent portfolios. The coefficient 
of Ln (Scaled Citation/Assets+1) is still positive but no longer significant. The coefficient of Ln 
(Scaled Patent/Assets+1) is still significantly positive at 0.9. The results suggest that the primary 
market incorporates the size but not the quality of IPOs’ patent portfolios into the final offer 
price valuations of IPOs with patents. The effect of the size of patent portfolios on the offer price 
valuation ratio is also economically significant. For an IPO with median Scaled Patent/Assets at 
0.029 (Table 1.D), a one standard deviation increase (0.616, Table 1.D)) in Scaled Patent/Assets 
is associated with the expected offer price to sales increasing by 42%.10 
Hirshleifer, Hsu, and Li (2012) document a positive relationship between innovative 
efficiency (patents or citations scaled by R&D expenditures) and future stock returns. Similarly, 
we include number of patents scaled by R&D expenses in column 4 and citations scaled by R&D 
in column 5. The coefficient estimates for innovation efficiency based on number of patents and 
future citations are significant and positive. In column 6/7, we include Ln (Scaled 
Patent/Assets+1) and Ln (Innovation efficiency-Pat+1)/Ln (Innovation efficiency-Citation+1) to 
control for the size of patent portfolios and innovative efficiency. The coefficient for innovative 
                                                                 
10 [ln(1+0.029+0.616)-ln(1+0.029)]*0.90 = 0.42 
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efficiency is still positive but no longer significant. The coefficient of Ln (Scaled 
Patent/Assets+1) is still significantly positive at 0.825/0.874. In summary, we find that the 
number of patents, the citation count, and innovation efficiency (patents or citations scaled by 
research and development expenditure) are positively associated with offer price multiples but 
the effect of the number of patents subsumes that of the citation count/innovation efficiency. 
Panels B and C of Table 3 report the results of regressions on IPO valuations for two sub-
periods. Similarly, it shows that the link between the size, quality of patent portfolios, and 
innovation efficiency and IPO valuations has strengthened over time.11 
3.2.2 Initial returns 
Table 4 reports the results of initial returns regressions (Eq. 2 with the Patent dummy 
replaced by various patent metrics), which estimate the effects of size, quality of the IPO’s patent 
portfolios, and innovation efficiency on the valuation change for IPOs from the primary market 
to the secondary market. None of the coefficients of the size and quality of IPO’s patent 
portfolios or innovation efficiency is significant, suggesting that underpricing is not related to the 
size, quality of the IPO’s patent portfolios, or innovation efficiency.  
Overall, the results on valuation ratios, price revisions, and initial returns suggest that: 1) 
information on having patents and the size of IPO patent portfolios are priced into IPO 
valuations from the beginning of the offering process, 2) information on having patents and the 
size of patent portfolios are uncorrelated with IPO underpricing. 
 
 
                                                                 
11 The un-tabulated results on expected valuation ratios are similar to those in Table 3. The unreported results on 
price revisions for IPOs with patents show that size, quality of patent portfolio, and innovation efficiency are not 
significantly correlated with price revisions. Those results are consistent with Table 2, which shows that the size of 
the IPO’s patent portfolio is priced into the IPO valuations from the beginning of the offering process . 
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3.3. The market value of newly public firms: Tobin’s Q 
 We use Tobin’s Q as a proxy of a firm’s valuation premium in this section to investigate 
the effects of the number of patents, the citation count, and innovation efficiency on IPO 
valuations.12 We use this proxy for several reasons. First, the extant literature on the patent 
valuation of seasoned public firms often uses Tobin’s Q as a proxy of a firm’s valuation 
premium. Second, using valuation ratios based on expected offer prices and offer prices, we 
show that having patents and/or larger patent portfolios has a significantly positive effect on IPO 
valuations in the primary market. Our results from valuation multiples in the primary market lead 
to the question of whether the positive effects that connect patent-related factors on Tobin’s Q 
from secondary market valuation are present from the very beginning of IPO firms’ public 
listing. To answer the question, we estimate models similar to those in Table 3 on Tobin’s Q for 
each IPO in our sample at the first day of secondary market trading (TobinsQ_day1) and at the 
IPO’s one-year anniversary (TobinsQ_year1). In addition, using final offer price, we also 
calculate Tobin’s Q for each IPO at day 0 – the offer price (TobinsQ_day0) – as a second 
measure of an IPO’s valuation in the primary market.  
TobinQ_day0 is defined as the sum of the firm’s market value of equity (offer price times 
the number of outstanding shares) and the book value of its total liabilities divided by the sum of 
the book value of its total assets and IPO proceeds. TobinQ_day1 is defined similarly except that 
we use the first trading day closing price to calculate the market value of equity. Book value of 
total assets and liabilities are for the fiscal year prior to IPO date. We follow Kim and Ritter 
(1999) and Hendricks and Miller (2014) by adding the amount of proceeds received from the 
IPO to the firm’s most recently reported book value of assets prior to the offering. Hendricks and 
                                                                 
12 We thank an anonymous referee for making the suggestion to analyze the effects of patents on Tobin’s Q for 
newly public firms.  
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Miller (2014) suggest that this calculation creates a more accurate representation of the assets 
being valued by investors at the beginning of the secondary market trading. TobinQ_year1 is 
defined as the sum of the firm’s market value of equity (fiscal year end closing price times the 
number of outstanding shares) and the book value of its total liabilities divided by the book value 
of its total assets. The fiscal year end closing price and book value of total assets and liabilities 
are for the one fiscal year after IPO date. 
 Table 5 provides the results of Tobin’s Q regressions. Panel A is for the Tobin’s Q for 
each IPO at day 0. We find that using Tobin’s Q derived from offer prices, the effect of the 
number of patents, the citation count, and innovation efficiency on IPO valuation is always 
positive. For example, the coefficients of Ln (Scaled Patent/Assets+1) are significantly positive. 
This result suggests that the positive effect that connects the size of patent portfolios to Tobin’s 
Q is present from the beginning of offerings for newly public IPOs. We also find that the positive 
effect of the size of patent portfolios on firms’ Tobin’s Q is present from the first day of trading 
in the secondary market – the results of Panel B for Tobin’s Q of each IPO at day 1 are 
consistent with those in Table 3, and the coefficients of Ln (Scaled Patent/Assets+1) are always 
significantly positive. Panel C for Tobin’s Q of each IPO at the IPO’s one-year anniversary 
shows results similar to those in Panel B. 
3.4. Innovation and long-run performance 
3.4.1. Long-run stock performance 
IPOs with patents and/or with larger patent portfolios could receive higher IPO valuations 
but still be mispriced in the primary market. The primary market could overvalue innovation at 
IPOs if the market is too optimistic about the growth potential embedded in innovation. On the 
other hand, the IPO valuations for innovation may be inadequate if investors are unable to assess 
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the prospects of innovation fully. In either case, the mis-valuation related to IPO patent portfolios 
should be reflected in long-run stock performance. In this section, we examine long-run stock 
performance to investigate whether the market values innovation appropriately at the IPOs.  
To evaluate long-run stock performance, we calculate buy-and-hold abnormal return 
(BHAR) as following:  
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖 = ∏ (1 + 𝑟𝑖𝑡
min (𝑇,𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡)
𝑡=1




where rat is the monthly return of IPO firm i in calendar month t (t=0 for IPO month), and mrit is 
the monthly return for the matched portfolio in calendar month t. T is the 12/24/36 th months after 
IPO issuance or delisting, whichever comes first. That is, if IPO firms are delisted from CRSP 
before 12/24/36 months after issuance, we will calculate the IPO and its matched portfolio buy-
and-hold returns only up to the delisting month. For each IPO firm, we identify a size and book-
to-market matched portfolio. We obtain 25 portfolios formed on size and book-to-market from 
Professor Kenneth R. French’s website.13 French creates quintile breakpoints based on market 
value of equity (size) and ratios of book value of equity to market value of equity (book-to-
market) using only stocks trading on the NYSE. The market value of equity for each year t is 
calculated at the end of June of year t. The book-to-market ratio for the June of year t is the book 
value of equity for the last fiscal year end in t-1 divided by market value of equity for December 
of t-1. The annual size breakpoints are then intersected with the book-to-market breakpoints to 
create 25 size and book-to-market portfolios using all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks for 
which they have data for market value of equity and (positive) book value of equity. We use an 
equally weighted return of all firms in a given portfolio. We then classify IPOs into these 




quintiles based on their market value of equity (offer price times number of outstanding shares) 
and book-to-market ratio (book value of equity for the fiscal year prior to IPOs divided by the 
market value of equity based on offer price). The corresponding portfolio is the IPO firm’s size 
and book-to-market matched portfolio. 
Panel A of Table 6 presents the regression results of the relation between the size and the 
quality of patent portfolios and BHAR – buy-and-hold cumulative abnormal returns – from one 
to three years after the IPO offerings for IPOs with patents. The results are largely consistent 
with prior studies. For example, one to three year abnormal buy-and-hold returns are positively 
related to the investment banker reputation (Carter, Dark, and Sapp, 2010). IPOs offered in the 
dot-com bubble period generally have lower abnormal long-term stock returns, suggesting that 
IPOs offered in the “hot” market tend to underperform (Derrien, 2005). Most importantly, the 
size and quality of IPOs’ patent portfolios are not significantly related to long-run stock returns. 
We find no evidence that IPOs’ patent portfolios are associated with abnormal post-IPO long-run 
stock returns, suggesting that IPOs with larger patent portfolios are not overvalued in the primary 
market, leading to no abnormal long-run stock performance in the secondary equity market than 
IPOs with smaller patent portfolios.  
3.2.2. Long-run operating performance 
We further investigate the effect of IPOs’ patent portfolios on post-IPO abnormal 
operating performance up to three years after IPOs. IPOs with larger patent portfolios could 
receive higher IPO valuations because investors view those IPOs as safer due to their patent 
portfolios or because investors perceive that those IPOs will have better operating performance 
and, therefore, generate more cash flows for investors. If the premium is due to the perceived 
lower risk, we should expect that IPOs with larger patent portfolios have similar or worse post-
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IPO long-run operating performance. Otherwise, IPOs with larger patent portfolios should have 
better post-IPO long-run operating performance.  
Panel B of Table 6 reports the regression results for post-IPO operating performance 
(measured as industry-adjusted OPA) for IPOs with patents. Several control variables at IPO 
appear to be significantly related to post-IPO operating performance. For example, operating 
performance is related to firm age as older IPOs tend to have better OPA. One to three year 
abnormal operating performances are positively related to the investment banker reputation 
(Dong, Michel, and Pandes, 2011). We do not find significance in any of the coefficients for the 
size and the quality of IPOs’ patent portfolios.  
Overall, results on long-run stock and operating performances suggest that the amount of 
the offer valuation premium of IPOs with larger patent portfolios is appropriate. For IPOs with 
patents, this premium is likely a response to the perceived lower risk due to larger patent 




In this paper, we investigate an important yet understudied aspect of IPOs, namely, the 
IPO valuations associated with innovation. Using patent metrics as measures of innovation 
capabilities, we investigate whether and how the primary market values the innovations of newly 
public firms at their IPOs by examining the link between the size, quality, and innovation 
efficiency of their patent portfolios and IPO valuations. We find that the number of patents, the 
citation count, and innovation efficiency are positively associated with offer price multiples but 
the effect of the number of patents subsumes that of the citation count and innovation efficiency. 
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The size, the quality, and innovation efficiency of an IPO’s patent portfolio have no significant 
effect on price revisions or IPO first-day returns, suggesting markets do not significantly 
undervalue the patent portfolio in the initial offer price. We obtain no evidence that an IPO’s 
patent portfolio is overvalued in the primary market, as the number of patents and the citation 
count are not significantly associated with long-run stock returns or long-run operating 
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This table reports the summary statistics of the key variables in the analysis. IPOs with patents are firms that are 
granted at least one patent in the 5 years before their IPO dates. IPOs without patents  are firms that do not receive 
any patent grant during the same period. Panel A (B) shows the year (industry) distribution of IPO firms. The year is 
defined with offering dates. The industry classification is defined with the first 2-digit primary SIC code following 
Song and Walking (1993). Panel C compares issue and firm characteristics for IPOs with and without patents . P-
value of mean difference is for the two-tailed t-test. P-value of median difference is for the two-tailed Wilcoxon 
rank-sum test. Panel D shows the patent information in the five years up to the IPO date for IPOs with patents. All 
variables are defined in the Appendix. 
Panel A. Year distribution 
Year 
# of IPOs 
 (1)/(3) 






1981 23 112 135 17 
1982 4 53 57 7 
1983 45 259 304 15 
1984 14 122 136 10 
1985 14 126 140 10 
1986 35 228 263 13 
1987 30 174 204 15 
1988 13 71 84 15 
1989 15 65 80 19 
1990 11 66 77 14 
1991 39 152 191 20 
1992 61 201 262 23 
1993 70 270 340 21 
1994 52 219 271 19 
1995 68 226 294 23 
1996 82 351 433 19 
1997 57 218 275 21 
1998 24 126 150 16 
1999 50 279 329 15 
2000 76 185 261 29 
2001 13 36 49 27 
2002 7 41 48 15 
2003 10 35 45 22 
2004 51 82 133 38 
2005 23 89 112 21 
2006 35 87 122 29 








Panel B. Industry Distribution 
 
# of IPOs 
(1)/(3) 
% 









 Agriculture (01-09)   5 14 19 26 
 Mining (10-14)   1 123 124 1 
 Construction (15-19)   3 47 50 6 
 Food and tobacco (20-21)   10 75 85 12 
 Textiles and apparel (22-23)   6 64 70 9 
 Lumber, furniture, paper, and print (24-27)   13 90 103 13 
 Chemicals (28)   124 244 368 34 
 Petroleum, rubber, and plastics (29-30)   9 40 49 18 
 Leather, stone, glass (31-32)   10 19 29 34 
 Primary and fabricated metals (33-34)   29 80 109 27 
 Machinery (35-36)   308 450 758 41 
 Transport equipment (37)   26 53 79 33 
 Instruments and miscellaneous manufacturing (38-39)   207 221 428 48 
 Transport, communications, utilities (40-49)   20 377 397 5 
 Wholesale trade (50-51)   10 178 188 5 
 Retail trade (52-59)   11 441 452 2 
 Hotels and personal services (70-71)   0 38 38 0 
 Services (72-89)   130 1,318 1,448 9 
 Public administration and others (90-99)   0 1 1 0 






Panel C: Issue and firm characteristics 
 











Issue characteristics      
Expected offer price 12.68 11.85 0.00 
 
914/3,841 
Offer price 12.57 11.92 0.00 
 
922/3,873 
Gross proceeds ($m) 76 59 0.01 
 
922/3,873 
VC 0.62 0.37 0.00 
 
922/3,873 
Age 16 15 0.19 
 
919/3,801 
Underwriter's rank 7.50 7.03 0.00 
 
904/3,805 
Top tier underwriter 0.69 0.59 0.00 
 
922/3,873 
Bubble 0.14 0.12 0.16 
 
922/3,873 
Tech 0.52 0.31 0.00 
 
922/3,873 
IPO market condition 0.21 0.23 0.74 
 
922/3,873 
      Firm characteristics      
Assets 265 160 0.02 
 
892/3,588 
Sales 246 169 0.04 
 
886/3,540 
Prior Industry-adjusted OPA -0.22 -0.11 0.00 
 
884/3,528 
Leverage 0.33 0.39 0.00 
 
892/3,588 
R&D 0.25 0.12 0.00 
 
922/3,873 
Sales growth 1.49 4.28 0.43 
 
841/3,450 
      Valuation      
Expected valuation ratio: P/S 122 99 0.66 
 
835/3,426 
median 4.39 2.56 0.00  835/3,426 
Valuation ratio: P/S 122 90 0.51 
 
842/3,453 
median 4.31 2.51 0.00  842/3,453 
Price revisions 0.00 0.01 0.22 
 
914/3,841 
Initial returns 0.21 0.20 0.83   922/3,873 
 
 
Panel D: Patent information 
Variable 25% Median Mean 75% SD N 
Number of patents  1.000 3.000 9.728 7.000 34.591 922 
Number of citations 0.000 3.000 17.741 11.000 59.325 922 
Scaled Patent 0.234 0.624 2.139 1.701 8.218 922 
Scaled Citation 0.000 1.254 6.301 4.512 19.971 922 
Scaled Patent /Assets 0.007 0.029 0.139 0.090 0.616 892 





IPO valuations: Patent vs. No Patent 
Panel A/B/C shows estimates of OLS regressions of IPO valuation for the full sample period 1981-2006/for the sub-
period 1981-1993/for the sub-period 1994-2006. The dependent variables are valuation measures at different IPO 
stages. The expected valuation ratios (offer valuation ratio) are defined as expected offer price (offer price) divided 
by sales per share from the fiscal year preceding the IPO date. The expected offer price is the midpoint of the initial 
price range. Price revision is the offer price divided by the midpoint of the initial filing price range minus one. 
Initial return is the closing price on the first trading day divided by the offer price minus one. Robust t -statistics are 
reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates. We control for industry (based on the 2-digit primary SIC code) 
and year (based on IPO date) fixed effects. The superscripts ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% level, respectively, in two-tailed tests. All variables are defined in the Appendix. 
Panel A: Full Sample Period: 1981 – 2006 
  Dependent variables 
 







revisions Initial returns 
Patent 
0.136*** 0.126** -0.012 -0.001 
(2.673) (2.429) (-1.288) (-0.046) 
PSind 
0.194*** 0.183***   
(4.669) (4.446)   
Ln(Proceeds) 
-0.134*** -0.068*** 0.064*** -0.031*** 
(-5.552) (-2.743) (11.860) (-3.302) 
Prior industry-adjusted 
OPA 
-1.314*** -1.293*** 0.021 -0.022 
(-9.290) (-8.929) (0.956) (-0.642) 
Leverage 
-0.006 -0.042 -0.044*** -0.046*** 
(-0.089) (-0.584) (-4.300) (-2.778) 
R&D 
0.491** 0.473** 0.038 0.001 
(2.091) (1.972) (1.247) (0.027) 
Growth 
0.252*** 0.255*** 0.004* 0.015*** 
(24.008) (24.097) (1.935) (4.081) 
VC 
0.348*** 0.349*** 0.004 0.016 
(7.948) (7.833) (0.511) (1.252) 
Ln(Age) 
-0.365*** -0.388*** -0.021*** -0.010* 
(-18.256) (-18.705) (-5.401) (-1.740) 
Top IB 
0.037 0.001 -0.028*** 0.018 
(0.817) (0.021) (-3.601) (1.459) 
Bubble 
1.225*** 1.208*** -0.006 0.383*** 
(7.998) (8.119) (-0.196) (9.447) 
Tech 
0.167*** 0.203*** 0.027** 0.010 
(2.638) (3.170) (2.231) (0.428) 
IPO market condition 
  0.004 0.002 
  (1.268) (0.689) 
Price revision 
   0.925*** 
   (10.404) 
Constant 
1.536*** 1.332*** -0.212*** 0.122** 
(3.634) (2.851) (-2.765) (2.382) 
Industry and Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4197 4228 4198 4198 




Panel B: Subsample period 
  
Period: 1981-1993  Period: 1994-2006 
Dependent variables  Dependent variables 
 


























0.057 0.043 -0.014 0.000  0.184*** 0.179** -0.009 -0.002 
(0.814) (0.616) (-1.326) (0.011)  (2.651) (2.538) (-0.666) (-0.081) 
PSind 
0.432*** 0.422***    0.207*** 0.202***   
(3.946) (4.008)    (3.642) (3.536)   
Ln(Proceeds) -0.046 0.003 0.041*** -0.016***  -0.190*** -0.104*** 0.088*** -0.033* 
(-1.482) (0.101) (8.374) (-3.210)  (-5.439) (-2.907) (9.028) (-1.768) 
Prior industry-adjusted 
OPA 
-0.891*** -0.822*** 0.074*** 0.029  -1.378*** -1.365*** 0.004 -0.010 
(-4.844) (-4.441) (2.702) (0.925)  (-6.996) (-6.735) (0.130) (-0.166) 
Leverage -0.057 -0.080 -0.027** -0.017  -0.013 -0.055 -0.053*** -0.060** 
(-0.527) (-0.740) (-2.176) (-1.357)  (-0.147) (-0.636) (-3.686) (-2.398) 
R&D 1.731*** 1.751*** 0.028 -0.001  0.360** 0.339** 0.040 0.006 
(7.457) (7.485) (1.280) (-0.059)  (2.343) (2.188) (0.867) (0.112) 
Growth 0.241*** 0.242*** 0.001 0.002  0.249*** 0.252*** 0.004* 0.017*** 
(9.718) (9.660) (0.839) (0.928)  (22.102) (22.165) (1.775) (3.994) 
VC 0.192*** 0.175*** -0.006 -0.003  0.399*** 0.418*** 0.022 0.033 
(3.697) (3.293) (-0.687) (-0.320)  (6.507) (6.718) (1.517) (1.338) 
Ln(Age) -0.344*** -0.361*** -0.015*** -0.013***  -0.366*** -0.396*** -0.028*** -0.013 
(-12.649) (-12.899) (-3.581) (-3.169)  (-12.163) (-12.696) (-4.294) (-1.156) 
Top IB -0.028 -0.072 -0.032*** -0.011  0.054 0.022 -0.028** 0.027 
(-0.497) (-1.266) (-3.458) (-1.387)  (0.791) (0.324) (-2.241) (1.193) 
Bubble      1.431*** 1.425*** 0.007 0.313*** 
     (12.688) (12.320) (0.274) (7.942) 
Tech 0.258*** 0.258*** -0.002 0.011  0.083 0.147* 0.050*** 0.010 
(3.089) (3.045) (-0.126) (0.836)  (1.016) (1.783) (2.776) (0.267) 
IPO market condition   0.176*** 0.055**    0.004 0.002 
  (6.829) (2.089)    (1.453) (0.582) 
Price revision    0.457***     1.046*** 
   (17.128)     (8.145) 
Constant 0.888 0.759 -0.151*** 0.088***  1.112*** 0.730 -0.375* 0.180** 
(1.554) (1.285) (-2.998) (2.904)  (2.907) (1.235) (-1.781) (2.197) 
Industry & Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,905 1,913 1,906 1,906  2,292 2,315 2,292 2,292 





IPO valuations (Offer price) for IPOs with patents 
Panel A/B/C shows estimates of OLS regressions of IPO valuations for the full sample period 1981-2006/for the sub-period 1981-1993/for the sub-period 1994-
2006. The dependent variables are the offer valuation ratio, defined as offer price divided by sales per share from the fiscal year preceding the IPO date. Robust t-
statistics are reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates. To save the space, coefficients for other independent variables for Panels B and C are  not 
reported and available upon request. We control for industry (based on the 2-digit primary SIC code) and year (based on IPO date) fixed effects. The superscripts 
***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively, in two-tailed tests. All variables are defined in the Appendix. 
 
Panel A: Full sample period: 1981-2006 
  Dependent variable: Offer valuation ratio - Ln(P/S) 
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Ln(Scaled Patent/Assets +1) 1.100***  0.900**   0.825* 0.874** 
(3.336)  (2.345)   (1.960) (2.489) 
Ln(Scaled Citation/Assets+1)  0.479*** 0.173     
 (3.737) (1.128)     
Ln(Innovation efficiency-Pat+1) 
 
   0.301***  0.109  
   (4.716)  (1.112)  
Ln(Innovation efficiency-Citaion+1)     0.168***  0.076 
    (3.672)  (1.445) 
PSind 
0.108 0.094 0.108 0.093 0.095 0.106 0.109 
(1.298) (1.122) (1.295) (1.059) (1.081) (1.214) (1.247) 
Ln(Proceeds) 
0.036 0.027 0.040 0.074 0.061 0.069 0.069 
(0.680) (0.493) (0.742) (1.278) (1.040) (1.182) (1.184) 
Prior industry-adjusted OPA -1.955*** -1.933*** -1.943*** -1.976*** -1.960*** -1.986*** -1.981*** 
(-6.614) (-6.489) (-6.588) (-6.022) (-6.008) (-6.154) (-6.173) 
Leverage -0.272* -0.215 -0.267* -0.219 -0.203 -0.261 -0.263 
(-1.686) (-1.389) (-1.655) (-1.294) (-1.206) (-1.500) (-1.507) 
R&D 1.609*** 1.702*** 1.596*** 1.868*** 1.816*** 1.592*** 1.569*** 
(6.770) (7.219) (6.766) (7.240) (7.181) (5.669) (5.972) 
Growth 0.212*** 0.215*** 0.212*** 0.210*** 0.210*** 0.206*** 0.206*** 
(9.396) (9.703) (9.404) (9.658) (9.687) (9.325) (9.284) 
VC 
0.329*** 0.294*** 0.321*** 0.368*** 0.315*** 0.344*** 0.326*** 
(3.711) (3.269) (3.595) (3.690) (3.176) (3.403) (3.309) 
Ln(Age) -0.497*** -0.512*** -0.502*** -0.563*** -0.578*** -0.561*** -0.568*** 
(-8.995) (-9.159) (-9.009) (-9.139) (-9.226) (-9.085) (-9.117) 
Top IB -0.017 -0.061 -0.021 -0.052 -0.077 -0.030 -0.034 
(-0.180) (-0.610) (-0.214) (-0.484) (-0.717) (-0.289) (-0.328) 
Bubble 1.192*** 1.096*** 1.182*** 1.174*** 1.021*** 1.201*** 1.156*** 
(4.615) (4.334) (4.582) (4.053) (3.618) (4.246) (4.038) 
Tech -0.059 -0.061 -0.063 0.006 -0.025 -0.028 -0.039 
(-0.509) (-0.527) (-0.547) (0.047) (-0.205) (-0.231) (-0.322) 
Constant 
1.379* 1.614** 1.402* 1.351* 1.622** 1.390* 1.454* 
(1.728) (2.084) (1.751) (1.821) (2.240) (1.793) (1.893) 
Industry and Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 851 851 851 743 743 743 743 




Panel B: Subsample period: 1981-1993 
  Dependent variable: Offer valuation ratio-Ln(P/S) 
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Ln(Scaled Patent/Assets +1) 
0.497  0.347   -0.033 0.138 
(1.111)  (0.662)   (-0.048) (0.260) 
Ln(Scaled Citation/Assets+1) 
 0.281 0.126     




   0.177*  0.185  




    0.116*  0.099 
    (1.900)  (1.391) 
Observations 346 346 346 296 296 296 296 
Adjusted R-squared 0.687 0.686 0.686 0.698 0.697 0.697 0.696 
 
Panel C: Subsample period: 1994-2006 
  Dependent variable: Offer valuation ratio-Ln(P/S) 
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Ln(Scaled Patent/Assets +1) 
1.629***  1.268**   1.236** 1.375** 
(3.316)  (2.369)   (2.084) (2.450) 
Ln(Scaled Citation/Assets+1) 
 0.610*** 0.283     




   0.598***  0.299**  




    0.270***  0.137 
    (3.474)  (1.584) 
Observations 505 505 505 447 447 447 447 




Initial returns of IPOs with patents 
This table shows estimates of OLS regressions of initial returns. The dependent variables are initial return s, defined as the closing price on the first trading day 
divided by the offer price, minus one. Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates. We control for industry (based on 2-digit 
primary SIC code) and year (based on IPO date) fixed effects. The superscripts ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively, in two-tailed tests. All variables are defined in the Appendix. 
  Dependent variables: Initial returns 
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Ln(Scaled Patent/Assets +1) 0.018  0.002   0.040 0.009 
(0.323)  (0.034)   (0.563) (0.140) 
Ln(Scaled Citation/Assets+1)  0.014 0.013     




   -0.008  -0.017  
   (-0.473)  (-0.817)  
Ln(Innovation efficiency-
Citaion+1) 
    0.003  0.002 
    (0.242)  (0.142) 
Ln(Proceeds) -0.027* -0.027* -0.027* -0.022 -0.020 -0.023 -0.020 
(-1.697) (-1.678) (-1.671) (-1.221) (-1.138) (-1.236) (-1.131) 
Prior industry-adjusted OPA 0.072 0.073 0.073 0.076 0.076 0.076 0.076 
(0.745) (0.756) (0.755) (0.689) (0.687) (0.691) (0.686) 
Leverage -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.005 -0.006 -0.007 -0.007 
(-0.347) (-0.332) (-0.335) (-0.135) (-0.194) (-0.202) (-0.213) 
R&D 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.013 0.016 0.002 0.014 
(0.278) (0.282) (0.270) (0.249) (0.315) (0.038) (0.252) 
Growth 0.011* 0.011* 0.011* 0.011* 0.011* 0.011* 0.011* 
(1.913) (1.928) (1.914) (1.946) (1.934) (1.897) (1.907) 
VC 0.026 0.025 0.025 0.027 0.028 0.025 0.028 
(0.911) (0.891) (0.890) (0.823) (0.874) (0.771) (0.873) 
Ln(Age) -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 
(-0.356) (-0.393) (-0.391) (-0.546) (-0.581) (-0.534) (-0.573) 
Top IB 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.009 0.010 0.010 0.011 
(0.216) (0.205) (0.206) (0.246) (0.288) (0.280) (0.296) 
Bubble 0.395*** 0.393*** 0.393*** 0.355*** 0.360*** 0.356*** 0.361*** 
(4.935) (4.938) (4.877) (4.347) (4.380) (4.344) (4.337) 
Tech 0.043 0.043 0.043 0.038 0.040 0.037 0.040 
(1.094) (1.088) (1.087) (0.879) (0.913) (0.825) (0.906) 
IPO market condition 0.118 0.118 0.118 0.111 0.110 0.110 0.110 
(1.616) (1.618) (1.618) (1.443) (1.434) (1.435) (1.432) 
Price revision 0.928*** 0.927*** 0.927*** 0.945*** 0.942*** 0.946*** 0.942*** 
(12.165) (12.177) (12.156) (11.636) (11.753) (11.645) (11.715) 
Constant -0.041 -0.038 -0.039 -0.019 -0.033 -0.016 -0.034 
(-0.406) (-0.384) (-0.386) (-0.172) (-0.302) (-0.141) (-0.313) 
Industry and Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 844 844 844 737 737 737 737 





Tobin’s Q for IPOs with patents 
This table shows estimates of OLS regressions of Tobin’s Q. The dependent variables in Panel A/B/C are the natural 
logarithm of Tobin’s Q measured at offer price (TobinQ_day0)/first trading day closing price (TobinQ_day1)/one 
year after IPO (TobinQ_year1). TobinQ_day0 is defined as the sum of the firm’s market value of equity (offer price 
times the number of outstanding shares) and the book value of its total liabilities divided by the sum of book value 
of its total assets and IPO proceeds. TobinQ_day1 is defined similarly except that we use the first trading day 
closing price to calculate the market value of equity. IPO proceeds are the number of shares sold in the offering 
multiplied by the offer price. Book value of total assets and liabilities are for the fiscal year prior to IPO date. We 
add the IPO proceeds to the most recent book value of assets prior to the IPO. TobinQ_year1 is defined as the sum 
of the firm’s market value of equity (fiscal year end closing price times the number of outstanding shares ) and the 
book value of its total liabilities divided by the book value of its total assets. The fiscal year end closing price and 
book value of total assets and liabilities are for the one fiscal year after the IPO date. In Panels A and B, the 
covariates of IPO financials are measured for the fiscal year prior to the IPO. In Panel C, the covariates of IPO firm 
financials are measured for the IPO year. Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates. 
To save the space, coefficients for other independent variables (Ln (Proceeds), Prior industry-adjusted OPA, 
Leverage, R&D, Capital Intensity, VC, Ln (Age), Top IB, Bubble, and Tech) are not reported and available upon 
request. We control for industry (based on the 2-digit primary SIC code) and year (based on the IPO date) fixed 
effects. The superscripts ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively, in two -










Panel A. Tobin’s Q ~  Offer price 
 Explanatory 
variables 
Dependent variables: TobinQ_day0 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Ln(Scaled 
Patent/Assets +1) 
0.256***  0.177*   0.213* 0.177** 
(2.935)  (1.750)   (1.929) (1.987) 
Ln(Scaled 
Citation/Assets+1) 
 0.121*** 0.066     
 (3.151) (1.438)     
Ln(Innovation 
efficiency-Pat+1) 
   0.056***  0.009  




    0.045***  0.027 
    (2.803)  (1.536) 
Observations 901 901 901 792 792 792 792 
Adjusted R-squared 0.457 0.456 0.457 0.439 0.440 0.441 0.443 
 
Panel B. Tobin’s Q ~  First trading day market closing price  
 Explanatory variables 
Dependent variables: TobinQ_day1 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Ln(Scaled Patent/Assets 
+1) 
0.277***  0.173*   0.193* 0.190** 
(3.229)  (1.684)   (1.849) (2.151) 
Ln(Scaled 
Citation/Assets+1) 
 0.148*** 0.089*     




   0.080***  0.035  
   (3.416)  (1.075)  
Ln(Innovation efficiency-
Citaion+1) 
    0.055***  0.035* 
    (3.054)  (1.704) 
Observations 901 901 901 792 792 792 792 
Adjusted R-squared 0.472 0.472 0.473 0.461 0.462 0.463 0.464 
 
Panel C. Tobin’s Q ~  Market price one year after offering  
 Explanatory variables 
Dependent variables: TobinQ_year1 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Ln(Scaled Patent/Assets 
+1) 
0.469***  0.339**   0.407*** 0.407*** 
(3.521)  (2.106)   (2.709) (2.942) 
Ln(Scaled 
Citation/Assets+1) 
 0.235*** 0.113     




   0.107**  0.018  
   (2.561)  (0.352)  
Ln(Innovation efficiency-
Citaion+1) 
    0.056**  0.017 
    (2.002)  (0.564) 
Observations 863 863 863 754 754 754 754 




Long run performances of IPOs with patents 
 
This table shows estimates of OLS regressions of long-run performances for IPO firms with patents. The dependent variables for column (A) are buy-and-hold 
abnormal returns for each IPO following the IPO month (T= 12, 24, and 36). The dependent variables for column (B) are industry-adjusted operating income 
before depreciation on assets (OPA) from one to three years after IPO. The industry adjusted OPA is defined as the difference between an IPO’s OPA and the 
median value of the same two-digit SIC industry’s OPA. The OPA is defined as the operating income before depreciation (OIBD) divided by total assets. Year 0 
represents the IPO year. Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates. The superscripts ***, **, * denote statistical significan ce at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively, in two-tailed tests. All variables are defined in the Appendix. 
 
  
(A) Dependent variables: BHAR  (B) Dependent variables: Post-IPO Industry-
adjusted OPA 
Explanatory variables Month (1, 12) Month (1, 24) Month (1, 36) Year +1 Year +2 Year +3 
Ln(Scaled Patent/Assets +1) 
0.202 0.069 0.116 -0.112 -0.102 -0.100 
(1.421) (0.262) (0.395) (-1.115) (-1.226) (-0.944) 
Ln(Scaled Citation/Assets+1) -0.019 0.048 0.025 0.017 -0.000 0.019 
(-0.235) (0.281) (0.145) (0.515) (-0.014) (0.308) 
Prior industry-adjusted OPA 
0.253 0.367 0.233 0.656*** 0.524*** 0.435*** 
(1.351) (0.976) (0.548) (10.236) (7.116) (4.611) 
Leverage -0.043 -0.111 -0.188 -0.020 0.027 0.002 
(-0.601) (-0.761) (-1.382) (-0.387) (0.638) (0.050) 
R&D 0.042 0.162 0.002 -0.231*** -0.214*** -0.241*** 
(0.379) (0.806) (0.010) (-3.461) (-3.640) (-2.933) 
Growth 
0.014 0.005 -0.008 0.002 -0.007 -0.008 
(0.895) (0.444) (-0.616) (0.637) (-1.416) (-1.324) 
VC 
0.044 0.121 0.167 -0.018 -0.009 0.011 
(0.823) (0.893) (1.281) (-0.821) (-0.359) (0.378) 
Ln(Age) 0.053* 0.070 0.075 0.053*** 0.040*** 0.051*** 
(1.875) (1.215) (1.185) (4.875) (3.577) (3.985) 
Top IB 0.165*** 0.250* 0.353** 0.038* 0.036* 0.068*** 
(3.172) (1.769) (2.581) (1.855) (1.739) (2.606) 
Bubble 
-0.591*** -0.978*** -1.075*** -0.012 -0.083 -0.051 
(-4.402) (-2.922) (-3.545) (-0.191) (-1.055) (-0.525) 
Tech 
-0.039 0.201 0.210 0.063* 0.046 0.021 
(-0.544) (1.512) (1.339) (1.789) (1.350) (0.537) 
Constant -0.554*** -0.545 -0.492 -0.145 -0.109 -0.089 
(-2.623) (-1.424) (-1.357) (-1.376) (-1.122) (-0.739) 
Industry and Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 834 834 834 815 755 695 
Adjusted R-squared 0.038 0.036 0.020 0.295 0.260 0.170 
39 
 
Appendix: Variable definitions 
 
  
Panel A: Patent metrics 
Scaled Patent 
The scaled number of patents granted in the five years before the IPO date. First, for 
each technology class defined by USPTO and patent grant year, we compute the average 
number of granted patents of all firms. Second, we scale the number of granted patents 
to the firm in a technology class in that year by the corresponding average value from 
the first step. Third, for each firm, we sum the scaled number from the second step 
across all technology classes and five years. 
Scaled Citation 
The citation count is the number of citations a patent receives upon its approval to the 
IPO year. We adjust for time and technology variation by scaling each patent citation 
count by the average of citations received by all patents granted in the same yea r and 
technology class defined by USPTO. For firm i, we compute C
ik
j
, the number of citations 
received in year j (j=max(-5, grant year-IPO year) to j=0, year 0 is the IPO year) by 
patent k, scaled by the average number of citations received in year j by all patents of the 
same technology class granted in the same year. Second, we sum scaled citations for 
IPO firm i’s patents granted over the previous five years before the IPO date as follows: 




j=max  (−5,grant year−IPO year) . 
Innovation 
efficiency- Pat 
The scaled number of patents (Scaled Patent) divided by R&D expenses in the year prior 
to the IPO date. 
Innovation 
efficiency-Citation 
The scaled current citations (Scaled Citation) divided by R&D expenses in the year prior 
to the IPO date. 
Panel B: Firm characteristics 
Age The number of years between incorporation and the IPO date. Firms' incorporation dates 
are from http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm. 
Prior industry-
adjusted OPA 
The difference between an IPO’s OPA and the median value of the same two -digit SIC 
industry’s OPAs for the fiscal year prior to the IPO date. The OPA is defined as the 
operating income before depreciation (OIBD) divided by total assets. 
Leverage The sum of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities divided by total assets. 
R&D The ratio of R&D expenses divided by total assets in the fiscal year prior to the IPO 
date. 
Growth The sales growth rate from the year prior to the IPO to the IPO year. 





Panel C: Issue characteristics 
Patent A dummy variable that equals one if firms have at least one patent granted in the five 
years before their IPO dates and zero otherwise. 
PSind 
Industry median of P/S (market value of equity divided by total sales) based on the two-
digit primary SIC code during the issuer’s IPO year.  
Proceeds The number of shares sold in the offering multiplied by the offer price. 
VC A dummy variable that equals one if firms are backed by venture capitalists before IPOs 
and zero otherwise. 
Top IB  A dummy variable that equals one if the lead underwriter’s updated Carter and 
Manaster rank (Loughran and Ritter (2004)) is 8 or more and zero otherwise. 
Bubble A dummy variable that equals one if the IPO occurred during the period 1999-2000 and 
zero otherwise. 
Tech A dummy variable that equals one if the firm is defined as a Tech firm in Loughran and 
Ritter (2004) and zero otherwise. 
IPO market 
condition 
The average initial returns of IPOs within the same two-digit primary SIC code industry 
of the sample IPO between a firm's IPO filing date and its IPO date. 
Expected valuation 
ratio 
The expected offer price divided by sales per share from the fiscal year preceding the 
IPO date. The expected offer price is the midpoint of the initial price range. 
Offer valuation ratio The offer price divided by sales per share from the fiscal year preceding the IPO date. 
TobinQ_day0 
The sum of the firm’s market value of equity (offer price times the number of 
outstanding shares) and the book value of its total liabilities divided by the sum of the 
book value of its total assets and IPO proceeds. The book values of total assets and 
liabilities are for the fiscal year prior to the IPO date.  
TobinQ_day1 
The sum of the firm’s market value of equity (first trading day closing price times the 
number of outstanding shares) and the book value of its total liabilities divided by the 
sum of book value of its total assets and IPO proceeds. Book values of total assets and 
liabilities are for the fiscal year prior to IPO date. 
TobinQ_year1 
The sum of the firm’s market value of equity (fiscal year end closing price times the 
number of outstanding shares) and the book value of its total liabilities divided by the 
book value of its total assets. The fiscal year end closing price and book value o f total 
assets and liabilities are for the one fiscal year after the IPO date. 
Price revisions The offer price divided by the mid-point of filing price range minus one. 
Initial returns The first trading day closing price divided by the offer price minus one. 
